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  In this paper we analyze firms’ ability to tacitly collude on prices 
in an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical product 
differentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discount 
factor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We also 
show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher 
quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of these 
new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous. 
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 31I n t r o d u c t i o n
It has recently been shown that prices are very important for deterring consumers from copying and
from buying copies from illegal ﬁrms who illegally make and sell them, both empirically (Papadopoulos
(2003)) and theoretically (Bae and Choi (2006) and Martínez-Sánchez (2007)),1 and that competition
drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion (Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007)). Price strategies thus
become very important in markets for piratable goods. These results raise the question of whether ﬁrms
might tacitly collude on prices in these markets. Moreover, the latest technological developments have
enabled consumers to make better and cheaper copies of original information goods (Martínez-Sánchez
(2008)), which raises the question of whether collusion is now more diﬃcult or easier than previously.
In this paper we investigate ﬁrms’ ability to tacitly collude on prices in an inﬁnitely repeated duopoly
game of vertical product diﬀerentiation. To that end we use the model developed by Belleﬂamme and
Picard (2007). They consider that the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, and they
analyze the pricing behavior of a multiproduct monopolist and a duopolist in a model of vertical product
diﬀerentiation, where there are two information goods which are perfectly (horizontally) diﬀerentiated
and equally valued by users. Belleﬂamme and Picard show that in a monopoly equilibrium prices are
neither unique nor symmetric, and that in a duopoly, when the cost of copying is high enough there
is a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies but when the cost of copying is low enough there is no
equilibrium in pure strategies although there is a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. They also
show that the multiproduct monopolist has an incentive to set lower prices than the duopolist because it
realizes that decreasing the price for one good increases demand for the other good by making copying
less attractive. Finally, Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007) show that a multiproduct monopoly makes for
greater welfare than a duopoly in the short run but provides lower incentives to create in the long run.
The fact that ﬁrms can collude in markets for vertically diﬀerentiated products has been analyzed by
Häckner (1994). He assumes that each ﬁrm produces a variant of the same product and the production
cost is zero. He ﬁnds that collusion is more easily sustained the more similar the products are, which con-
trasts with the results obtained in horizontal product diﬀerentiation models (Chang (1991) and Häckner
(1996)). Recently, ﬁrms in markets for information goods have developed technological tools known as
digital rights management (DRM) to prevent the copying of their goods. The cost of DRM systems can
be shared among various ﬁrms, which have a collusive impact on prices according to Park and Scotchmer
(2006).
Schultz (2005) analyzes the eﬀect of increased consumer information about prices in the market on
ﬁrms’ ability to collude, and shows that collusion becomes harder to sustain when consumer information
increases. On the other hand, Liu and Serfes (2007) obtain that collusion becomes more diﬃcult as the
quality of ﬁrms’ information about consumers’ preferences improves.
Bae and Choi (2006) investigate the role of the reproduction cost of copies made by consumers without
1See Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) for a survey of piracy in which copies are made exclusively by end consumers. However,
there is another literature that analyzes the case of a single ﬁrm that illegally makes copies and sells them on the market,
which is known as commercial piracy (Martínez-Sánchez (2007) and López-Cuñat and Martínez-Sánchez (2009)).
4the authorization of producers. They assume that the reproduction cost is constant across consumers
and ﬁnd that an increase in the reproduction cost induces more authorized usage of the software but
less total usage of the software, so it may increase or decrease social welfare in the short-run. Moreover,
higher reproduction costs result in lower quality, which reduces social welfare in the long-run. Thus, an
increase in the reproduction cost may reduce social welfare in the short-run and long-run.
In recent years the quality of copies has become closer to the quality of original information goods.
López-Cuñat and Martínez-Sánchez (2009) prove that the initial quality diﬀerential between the original
and the copy is critical. On the one hand, the standard wisdom showing that an increase in the quality
of copy increases piracy should be reviewed. They show that this is a local conclusion because when the
initial quality diﬀerential is low enough an increase in the quality of copies may deter commercial piracy.
On the other hand, López-Cuñat and Martínez-Sánchez prove that the eﬀects on the optimal monitoring
rate which deters piracy depend on the initial quality diﬀerential. If it is low enough, an increase in the
quality of the copy may decrease the optimal monitoring rate. Nevertheless, if it is high enough, a local
increase in the quality of the copy may increase the optimal monitoring rate, but a non local increase
may decrease it.
We show that ﬁrms collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough, i.e. if they value future
proﬁts suﬃciently. We also show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher
quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall eﬀect of these new characteristics of copies made
by consumers is ambiguous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 obtains and
analyzes the equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Following Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007) we consider that there are two information goods which are




,w i t hθ > 0, for any information good, where θ follows a uniform distribution and represents the
consumers’ tastes for the quality of the good. Information goods can be copied by consumers when they
incur a ﬁxed cost K>0, so the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. However, this
technology provides a copy whose quality, sc, is lower than that of the original information good, so, i.e.
0 <s c <s o.W ea s s u m eθsc−K ≥ 0, so all consumers prefer copying a single good to not consuming any
information goods. Thus, each consumer is assumed to obtain one unit of each good, by either buying it





2θso − p1 − p2 if he buys both goods
θso + θsc − pi − K if he buys one good and copies the other
2θsc − K if he copies both goods
(1)
5where pi represents the price of the original information good i =1 ,2. By comparing the levels of utility
obtained from each consumer’s strategy we ﬁnd the demand function for information good i =1 ,2:2
Di (pi,p j)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
























if pi <p j − K
(2)
where s = so−sc. According to Belleﬂamme and Picard, each segment of the demand function corresponds
to a speciﬁc category of consumers: buyers, copiers and switchers. When pi ≥ pj + K, consumers are
buyers because they buy good j regardless of whether they buy or copy good i.W h e npi <p j −K,t h e y
are copiers because they copy good j whatever they decide about good i. Thus, in these two categories,
the demand for good i does not depend on the price of good j. Finally, when pj − K ≤ pi <p j + K,
consumers are switchers because they buy (copy) good j if they buy (copy) good i. Thus, the demand
negatively depends on both prices, so in this range of prices the two goods are complementary.
Notice that information goods become complementary although they have independent content. This
is because consumers are able to copy with a technology with increasing returns to scale. Finally, we
assume that θs > θ(s + so), which means that in any demand regime ﬁrms never ﬁnd it optimal to cover
the whole market.
Following Friedman (1971), we consider an inﬁnitely repeated game in which ﬁrms play trigger strate-
gies. In particular, ﬁrms start by charging collusive prices and continue charging these prices if neither
ﬁrm has deviated in a previous stage. However, if either ﬁrm deviates in a stage, then both ﬁrms revert
to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the following stages. We assume perfect monitoring, so if a ﬁrm has
deviated it is immediately detected but the punishment is implemented in the following stage.
In the next section, we seek to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the inﬁnitely repeated
game.





i be the one period collusion, deviation and Bertrand-Nash proﬁts of ﬁrm i =1 ,2,
respectively. Collusion on prices is an SPE of the game if and only if the present value of collusion proﬁts













i ∀i =1 ,2,( 3 )
where δ represents the discount factor. We assume that the production cost incurred by ﬁrms is zero.
Given that ﬁrms are symmetrical, we focus on symmetric equilibrium. In order to make the paper more
readable we eliminate subscript i on prices and proﬁts. When ﬁrms collude on prices, they behave as a
2For a more detailed analysis see Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007).
6multiproduct monopoly. From Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007), we have that ﬁrms price pC and obtain










The punishment proﬁts are the Bertrand-Nash proﬁts corresponding to the duopoly equilibrium.
Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007) show that, in duopoly, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium


















Hence, we assume that K>b K, because we focus on pure strategy equilibria given the multiplicity
and complexity of mixed-strategy equilibria.3 If a ﬁrm deviates from the collusive agreement, it prices
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4 if b K<K≤ 2θs/7
6θs+3K







16s if b K<K≤ 2θs/7
(6θs+3K)
2
128s if K ≥ 2θs/7
(8)
When K ≥ 2θs/7, although the cheating ﬁrm deviates from the collusive agreement, it continues to





the cheating ﬁrm decides to concentrate on higher-value consumers (buyers) by increasing its price and
avoid switchers. From inequality (3), collusion proﬁt (4), duopoly proﬁt (5) and the deviation proﬁt( 8 ) ,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms decide to collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough.
Proposition 1 Collusion is sustainable as an SPE if and only if
δ ≥ δ =
πD − πC






2s2+40θsK−53K2 if b K<K≤ 2θs/7
9
17 if K ≥ 2θs/7,
where δ represents the lowest discount factor that is needed to sustain collusion between ﬁrms.
3Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007) ﬁnd a mixed-strategy equilibrium when h K =0 .0274θs < K < e K.
4See Belleﬂamme and Picard (2007).
7The new characteristics of copies made by consumers have two opposing eﬀects on ﬁrms’ ability to
collude in markets for information goods: on the one hand, the quality of copies is becoming closer and
closer to that of the original good, which hinders collusion; on the other hand, the cost of copying is low
and is decreasing over time, which facilitates collusion. Thus, the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. Therefore,
authorities should pay special attention in these markets to prevent tacit collusion. These results are
extracted from the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When b K<K≤ 2θs/7, δ is increasing on the cost of copying, K, but is decreasing on the
degree of diﬀerentiation, s, and on the maximal willingness to pay for quality on the part of consumers,
θ. However, when K ≥ 2θs/7,t h ee ﬀect of s, K and θ on δ is null.
Proof: see Appendix.
A surprising result is that collusion is more diﬃcult to sustain when the quality of the copy is more
similar to that of the original good, which contrasts with the results of Häckner (1994), who ﬁnds that
collusion is more easily sustained the more similar the products are. However, it is in keeping with those
results obtained in horizontal product diﬀerentiation models (Chang (1991) and Häckner (1996)). This
is because we consider that there are two information goods that are horizontally diﬀerentiated although
they can be copied with a lower quality. In vertical diﬀerentiation models high-quality ﬁrm has weak
incentives to collude when products are very diﬀerent, but in horizontal diﬀerentiation models both ﬁrms
are identical and deviation proﬁts are lower when diﬀerentiation increases (Chang (1991), Häckner (1994)
and Häckner (1996)).
Unfortunately, given the non existence of equilibria in pure strategies when the copying cost is very
low, we cannot supply a conclusion in the limit case in which K =0for a positive value of s. However,
as s → 0, we get that the lowest discount factor that is needed to sustain collusion is independent of K
since lims→0 δ =9 /17. Thus, as the quality of the copy is very close to that of the original good, copying
costs have no eﬀect on the ability of ﬁrms to collude.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we analyze ﬁrms’ ability to collude in markets for information goods and the consequences
of lower copying costs and a higher copy quality on that ability in an inﬁnitely repeated duopoly game
of vertical product diﬀerentiation with price competition.
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rm o d e lﬁrms tacitly collude if and only if they value future proﬁts suﬃciently, and
the new characteristics of pirated copies have two opposing eﬀects on ﬁrms’ ability to collude: on the one
hand, copies are ever closer in quality to the original good, which hinders collusion; on the other hand,
the cost of copying is low and is decreasing over time, which facilitates collusion. Thus, the overall eﬀect
of these new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous. Therefore, authorities should pay
special attention in markets for information goods to prevent tacit collusion between ﬁrms, so as not to
harm the ﬁnancial incentives of creators.
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´2 < 0.
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